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ABSTRACT
The study analyzed how independent and state media’s news programs differ in
the way they framed the Georgian Revolution of Roses. The paper analyzed what
sources, frames and key words journalists used to describe the protest in order to
investigate if the coverage was objective or biased in any particular direction.
Study provides evidence that by framing protests in a different way, politicians
and journalists give different meanings to the same issues and suggest what is at issue.
Each party of the political elite tried to promote their own political viewpoints. By
preferring sources from the ruling party and their supporters and repeating frames and
key words suggested by the ruling party, state television supported the ruling party. By
quoting frequently reformers and their supporters and framing the event in a way offered
by the reformers, the independent media supported the viewpoints of the reformers.
This participatory position of the independent station is supported by
developmental theory, which says media in countries in transition have to assist to the
process of democracy. (Baran & Davis, 2003). In the case of Georgia, the opposition was
considered eager to fulfill democratic reforms and so the independent media supported
their political views.
However, the free press theory suggests that bias is against all professional norms
of journalism, regardless the intentions of media to have bias for the “right” side of an
issue. (Leigh, 1974). A free press has to offer balanced and objective reports of the event
or issue. Otherwise, it will not be credible and lose the public trust, which is most
valuable to a free press. (Leigh, 1974). The coverage of the Revolution of Roses in the
v

independent station was not beneficial to the development of a free press. It becomes
even more obvious how important an unbiased press is now that the former reformers
have become the government. The state TV is still maintaining the ruling party’s political
viewpoints and the independent television became part of the government’s public
relations machine by conveying mostly positive news about the policymakers and
policies.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to analyze how independent and state media’s prime-time
news programs differ in the way they framed the Georgian Revolution of Roses. The protests of
the 2003 election outcomes in Georgia, the so-called Revolution of Roses, came at a time when
two TV companies – state-owned “The First Channel” and independent Rustavi 2 -- were
dramatically polarized: the state-owned station supported the point of view of the government
and the independent station maintained the position of the opposition. The primary aim of the
paper is to analyze what sources, frames, key words and terms journalists used to describe the
large-scale protest in order to investigate if the coverage was fair, accurate and balanced or
biased in any particular direction.
Exploration of media biases is one of the important questions for contemporary Georgian
media. “Public deliberation (reasoning and discussion about the merits of public policy) is
essential to democracy, in order to ensure that the public’s policy preferences – upon which
democratic decisions are based – are informed, enlightened, and authentic.” (Page, 1996, p.1).
However, in modern societies, public deliberation is mediated, even limited, to the expression of
the viewpoints of professional communicators – politicians, experts, journalists, etc. -- via media.
It is extremely important for the ordinary citizen to know if the news program they are watching
has any particular preferences regarding their news sources and the way they present the news
event. Understanding media preferences and biases becomes especially essential during conflicts
and crises, because people living in unstable times become dependent on the media. (BallRockeach & DeFleur, 1976).
The study will compare the independent and state-owned media's framing of the
revolution of Georgia; and analyze how these differences influence the final news product.
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The key reason for the revolution was that president Eduard Shevardnadze and his party “For the
New Georgia” tried to tamper with the 2003 parliamentary elections and make it appear that his
own party had been re-elected. Opposition factions of the parliament, headed by reformers,
insisted on canceling the official results. They, together with Georgian non-governmental
organizations monitoring the elections, said that parallel vote counts and exit polls, which were
showing different results, were more credible. According to those results, the opposition was the
winner.
Citizens of Georgia who were loyal to the opposition protested the 2003 election
outcomes. The protests took place throughout the whole country. The revolution took as its
symbol a red rose held by Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the protest movement, when he and
his supporters stormed into the Parliament building. Eventually, Shevardnadze was forced to
resign.
State-owned TV company “The First Channel” and independent TV company Rustavi 2
were covering the Revolution of Roses in a dramatically polarized way: the state-owned
television company became the mouthpiece of the old regime and the independent television
station turned out to be in the vanguard of the revolution (Lincoln, 2004; Devdariani, 2004).
They both well illustrate the argument of Schudson (2003) about the media: “by selecting,
highlighting, framing, shading, and shaping in reportage, they create an impression that real
people – readers and viewers – then take to be real and to which they respond in their lives”
(Schudson, 2003, p.2). These two TV companies created two different realities of the revolution.
It is important to know what were the particular differences between state-owned and
independent media in framing of the revolution and what was the general effect of it on their
news programs. Knowing this will allow the audience to understand if any of these television
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stations provided them with objective information, whether coverage of the revolution was fair
and balanced, or whether the facts were biased in a favorable way for any of the opposing
parties.
The study is important for several reasons. In a democratic society, the exchange of
information and ideas through the free press as well as free and open public debate is a crucial
element of mass participation and a requirement for democratic responsiveness to public
preferences (Sartori, 1987). Existence of a free press, which provides the citizens with objective
information, is even more important for countries that are moving towards democracy. Georgia
is one of them. Without this exchange of information and ideas, citizens won’t be able to
understand fully the value or harm of particular policies or decisions of the government, and
can’t judge virtues of political candidates and policymakers; this means they can’t make
informed decisions regarding the policies affecting their lives, can’t take part fully in the
political, economic and social processes of the country, can’t influence the development of the
country and don’t have enough power to facilitate democracy.
Researchers have indicated that journalists, reporters, commentators, experts and
television pundits have a substantial impact upon the policy preferences of the general public
(Page, 1996; Said, 1997; Mahnheim, 1991). So it becomes important to study media messages
during the Revolution time. This research will allow us to begin to understand the role of the
media during crises and social changes such as the Revolution of Roses. It is extremely
important for Georgia, a country where democracy still is in its transition stage, since one of the
essential conditions of successful democracy is free media as a space for public deliberation. The
study will introduce new material to the field of Georgian media research and suggest some
further research questions. Until recently, there have been no academic and scientific studies of

3

mass communication in Georgia except Sulkhanishvili’s (2003) and Koplatadze’s (2004)
master’s theses. This thesis expands upon their work. The present study will help academics to
look at some trends in the Georgian media environment, using the example of the most polarized
and most-watched television companies. The results of the study can provide some evidence for
future research.
This research also will help professionals in the field to understand how sources and their
own cultural or social biases can influence the outcome of the news. Journalists can determine if,
as Mindich (1998) suggests, a responsible journalist has to offer something more than passive
“objectivity.” He proposes that journalists can interpret reality, not just transmit pure facts, but
they have to explain how they interpret reality and why the public should believe them.
The study will provide common citizens with knowledge of what kind of news programs
they watch and how news is packaged. This will help them to be aware of the differences
between state-owned and private television. They will have a clearer understanding of whether
watching the news programs provided by either of the TV channels enable them to receive
objective, fair and balanced information. They will be more aware of whether they need to take
steps to ensure they receive “a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's
events in a context which gives them meaning;” (Leigh, 1974, p. 21). The audience will
understand how the media present and clarify the goals and values of society during a crisis; they
can see if the media are a forum for free and open debate or are limited to the specific political or
economical preferences of their owners and reporters. This, in turn, will help them make more
informed and enlightened decisions regarding policymakers and policies.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Political Background
Georgia, one of the former republics of Soviet Union, declared independence from the
Soviet Union in 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze became the president of Georgia in 1995, following
the first president, Zviad Gamsaxurdia, who ruled the country from 1992-95. Shevardnadze was
well-known and popular in the West for his role in helping dismantle the former Soviet Union
and the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s, when he was the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Soviet
Union. In Georgia his ruling style was known as a “balancing style of governance” that refers to
his ability to balance two opposing factions of the parliament – the old communist bureaucracy
and the new generation of Western- oriented politicians who called for reforms. The old
communist bureaucracy controlled all law enforcement and security agencies. The reformers
demanded radical changes in the political and economic life of Georgia, the abandoning
communist-styled governing and the reforming of law enforcement agencies to protect civil
rights.
The conflict between these two factions became stronger in 1998-2000, when the
reformers declared that the president and his associates were unable to lead the country toward
democracy, and that instead of making the reforms, the country was facing rising levels of
corruption in almost every sphere of political and economic development. They formed a radical
opposition: “The National Movement” party led by parliament member Mikheil Saakashvili, and
“Burjanadze-The Democrats” party lead by speaker of the parliament Nino Burjanadze and
parliament member Zurab Jvania.
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The president was no longer able to maintain the balance. He changed the name of his
party from “Citizen’s Union” to “For the New Georgia” and began promoting the party for the
2003 parliamentary elections.
In addition to the three main political parties -- “For the New Georgia,” “The National
Movement” and “Burjanadze – The Democrats” - there were four other political parties that were
relatively popular among the citizens of Georgia: The New Rights, The Labor Party, Industry
Will Save Georgia and Revival Party. These parties were somewhat represented in the Georgian
parliament after 1995. Reformers often refer to these parties as allies of the ruling party and not
real opposition (Khoperia, 2003). Other small parties, such as Greens, Unity, etc. were such
small parties that they were not considered to be competitive.
The elections of 2003 became critical for the country. The popular consensus was that the
president’s party was to blame for corruption, poverty and impediment of the country’s
development. "There were two truly unusual things about this election," said Tinatin Khidasheli,
president of the Young Lawyers Association, one of the non-governmental organizations
monitoring the elections. (Antelava, 2003, p.1). "One is that this is the first time that Georgia's
people had a choice, a genuine choice - not between various pro-governmental parties, but
among real opposition parties who have different agendas. And also the voter turnout was
incredibly high." (Antelava, 2003, p.1).
President Shevardnadze and his party “For the New Georgia” tried to tamper with the
2003 parliamentary elections and make it appear that his own party had been re-elected. Since
1995, when Shevardnadze became president of Georgia, the country had gone through two civil
wars and was in a deep political, economic, and social crisis. It was hardly a surprise that
eventually the issue of election tampering would be seen as another failure of Shevardnadze and

6

his ruling party to respect its citizens. Protests of 2003 election outcomes turned into calls for the
resignation of Shevardnadze and his government. (Sulkhanishvili, 2003). At the end of the
Election Day, 2nd November, the National Movement Party and their supporters gathered in the
Griboedov Theater. They installed a big screen in order to show the independent television
station’s news program, which transmitted results of the exit polls and parallel vote count
organized by international companies and the Georgian non-governmental organization “Fair
Elections.” According to these organizations, the National Movement party was the winner.
While the party was celebrating its victory, members of Shevardnadze’s party “For the New
Georgia” began saying that the official results of the elections were different and that “For the
New Georgia” had won the elections. “You’ll see it tomorrow,” said one of the leaders of “For
the New Georgia” on a live talk show on the independent station. (Khoperia, 2003).
The next day the National Movement party began organizing protests alleging election
tampering in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. The Central Election Committee publicized
preliminary results of the elections. According to the CEC, the president’s party was re-elected.
The “Burjanadze – the Democrats” party formed an alliance with the National Movement party
and joined the protests. The alliance called for widespread protests all over the country. Citizens
of Georgia living in the regions led by Saakashvili organized long protest caravans and gathered
in the capital.
By the 23rd of November, several thousand people gathered in front of parliament calling
for the resignation of Shevardnadze. Despite the objections of the National Movement party,
Burjanadze – The Democrats, Georgian non- governmental organizations monitoring the
elections, international observers, and others, Shevardnadze tried to organize the first meeting of
his new parliament. Saakashvili, the leader of the National Movement party, and his supporters
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stormed the parliament building carrying red roses as a symbol of non-violence and insisted on
the resignation of the president. Shevardnadze’s bodyguards had to escort the president out of the
parliament building. At the end of the day, Saakashvili and Jvania, a leader of Burjanadze - The
Democrats, went to visit Shevardnadze at his home and received an official letter of the
president’s resignation signed by Shevardnadze. After the president stepped down, the speaker of
the parliament Burjanadze canceled the results of the 2003 elections and declared new elections
would be held in early 2004. Mikheil Saakashvili and a new generation of Western-oriented
reformer politicians came to power. Saakashvili became president.
The Western and local media considered it a crucial step toward democratic changes in
Georgia. “The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but also
for democracy globally. The revolution that took as its symbol a red rose demonstrated that, by
aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and
applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic
kleptocracy” (Lincoln, 2004, p.347). Experts consider television to be one of the most important
media for the protest leaders during the revolution (Devdariani, 2004). In particular, researchers
refer to the independent television company Rustavi2. The station’s coverage of the protests was
almost nonstop. They often invited opposition leaders and their supporters and provided them
with unlimited opportunity to express their viewpoints. The protest leaders used this time to
inform Georgians about upcoming demonstrations and actions (Lincoln, 2004). “The station
always showed images of demonstrators tightly packed together, shying away from aerial shots
that might have shown that the protesters were crowded in a relatively small space. Rustavi 2’s
image of the vigil differed just enough from reality to give viewers the impression that there
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really was a mass movement actively supporting Saakashvili and the opposition.” (Lincoln,
2004, p.345)
Media Development
During the period of the Communist regime in Georgia (1921-91), the First Channel was
state-owned and fully controlled by the state. Television broadcasting was in its authoritarian
phase; the government completely dominated the media for the purpose of forcing those media to
serve the ruling communist party (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). Censorship was the
natural everyday practice of media professionals. “Much of the Soviet Union's seven-decade
existence saw an extreme example of highly organized communication control. Media
constraints were so centralized and thorough that serious alternatives to the official line of the
ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on even a small scale, did not exist.” (Gibbs, 1999,
p.3). At the end of the Communist period, during “perestroika” (economic restructuring) and
“glastnost” (openness to criticism of the Soviet government), Mikhail Gorbachev’s government
was in the forefront of change. Gorbachev aggressively promoted glastnost as a component of
his reconstruction of Soviet economics. Gibbs (1999) argues that he started to use the media in
order to overcome controversy within the party and affirm his own reforms. He accomplished
this by allowing critiques of the government to appear in the media of that period. “Of new
contents and topics permitted under glastnost, Gorbachev was most approving of those which
favored the reform course or which highlighted problems associated with his political
adversaries… Gorbachev was highly sensitive to media use he considered counter-productive to
his aims.” (Gibbs, 1999, p.89). Thus, Gorbachev’s conditional reform broadened the public and
mass media discussion of selected topics, but still monitored the process carefully. There was no
more official body censoring the media, but there was an unwritten agreement between the
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media and Gorbachev on which issues could be made public and which could not, which
practices media could criticize and which were taboo. The control was less severe than
censorship, but it still existed.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when independence returned to Georgia,
the Georgian press had almost every feature of the libertarian press (Bokeria, Targamadze &
Ramishvili, 1997). Along with the state-owned television channel some private-owned channels
were established. Many different news programs were created. Some of the TV news programs
and especially their weekly analytical editions, mostly aired live, were creating the venues for
fair debate. “In the last few years, particularly starting in the spring of 1997, certain changes
have taken place that show the process of democratic development is entering a new phase,”
wrote Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders of the Liberty Institute, a non-governmental organization
protecting civil rights and freedom of the press. “The development of civil society requires more
publicity in public life. The media is doing its part to end the problem of an under-informed
society by presenting diverse viewpoints and forming an open system of disseminating
information” (Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997, p.29). Thus, a free marketplace of ideas
was created.
Developmental theory serves as a good description of Georgian media in the late 1990s
(Baran & Davis, 2003). This theory says that when a nation is in transition from an authoritarian
regime to a well-established democracy, and its economic development is low, media must be
more supportive than critical of their government. (Baran & Davis, 2003). Journalists should
help the government to promote development of the country. The development concept describes
systems in which government and media work together to guarantee successful development of a
given nation. (Baran & Davis, 2003). Hence the successful development of the country was not
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associated with the government of Georgia and President Shevardnadze, but with the reformers
and the media allied with them that supported their positions.
Since the late ‘90s Georgian media has quoted mostly oppositional sources. Koplatadze
(2004) studied frames in Georgian media in the coverage leading up to the 2003 elections. He
found that the Georgian press cited the opposition and used antigovernment key words that
indicate that opposition influenced the news construction more than the government (Koplatadze,
2004).
However, the Georgian government still had certain mechanisms to manipulate the
independent media. “Although the state monopoly on printing and distribution, which presented
a powerful mechanism for control of the press, is gone, there are other significant levers in the
hands of the authorities, for instance, lawsuits against the media.” (Bokeria, Targamadze &
Ramishvili, 1997, p. 19). Georgian media are more vulnerable to lawsuits than Western media,
because the government has more influence on judges than governments in the West and can
ensure a favorable outcome. Also, the tax police have strong powers and can paralyze the
activities of media that are under inspection. “Investigation of economic violation” was the
official reason given by the Georgian government when the Investigative Department of the
Ministry of National Security tried to paralyze the broadcasting of the most popular independent
TV Channel Rustavi 2 in 2001 (Sulkhanishvili, 2003).
Mass demonstrations took place in Tbilisi. Citizens tried to support the channel and thus
defend a free press. The leaders of the Revolution of Roses called the protests in defense of a
free press in 2001 a general rehearsal for the revolution; the nationwide protests in November,
2003 were carried out in order to defend the right of the citizen to elect their favorite candidates
in a free and objective election process.

11

Theoretical Background
The purpose of the study is to examine the differences, if any, in the coverage of the
Revolution of Roses by the state-owned television and independent Georgian television. This
study employs theoretical perspectives derived from framing and indexing theories.
Framing Theory. The process by which the political players and also media professionals
and audiences define and give meaning to issues and connect them to a larger political
environment has come to be known as framing (Entman, 1993). The theory is essential to the
present study, because by looking at the presence and absence of certain frames the researcher
will be able to examine the differences, if any, in news stories aired on the state-owned and
private-owned television companies.
The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman’s (1974) seminal work. The underlying
presumption was that the organization of messages affects the viewers’ subsequent thoughts and
actions. In general, framing involves the organization and packaging of information. Gamson
and Modigliani (1987) make this point clear when they say frames are the "central organizing
idea or storyline that provides meaning" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) or "a central
organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue" (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989, p. 57). Their general idea is that a frame is a useful discursive device that
helps professional communicators in constructing the meaning of an event or an issue and
channels the audience toward desirable understanding of it. (Gitlin, 2003). Framing is "the
process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political
issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue" (Nelson, Oxley, &
Clawson, 1997a, p. 222). Nelson and his colleagues (1997b) provide the best, most
comprehensive common definition, and the one that shows the way toward linking framing and
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deliberation. In other words, "framing is the process by which a communication source …
defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy" (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997b
p. 567). This definition points to the heart of framing - the construction of political, social,
economic and other important issues. This idea of associations is critical to understanding
framing. A model of framing can be built on the premise that to frame a message in a given way
entails certain associations rather than others. For example, Georgian newspapers’ coverage of
the 2003 elections provided substantial background for the opposition parties. “By stressing
government responsibility, the media facilitated oppositional parties’ efforts to spread their antigovernmental messages, to reduce trust in government, and hence to succeed in supporters’
mobilization across the country.” (Koplatadze, 2004, p.35).
“Frames define the problem, diagnose its cause, offer and justify treatments for the
problem and predict their likely effects” (Entman, 1993, p.52). Evidence suggests the power of
frames to shape a citizen’s policy support and related political perceptions (Callaghan & Schnell,
2001; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Nelson et al., 1997b). Political elites can effectively use frames to
promote their own political ends. And by repeating or neglecting certain frames suggested by
politicians, the media either promote or prevent from promoting certain political ends of
politicians. This study will look at what kind of frames the independent television station’s news
program and the news program of the state-owned television station chose. It will examine
whether the choice of certain frames promoted the political goals of the government or its
opposition.
One of the important findings of Koplatadze’s (2004) study is that the government
responsibility frame dominated the Georgian press of the period leading up to the 2003 elections.
This, together with frequent usage of anti-governmental sources and keywords, indicates that the
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opposition influenced the news construction much more than the government. He said that media
of that period not only selected the issue and shaped it favorably to the opposition, but also
identified the directions of the responsibility for the cause of the problem (Koplatadze, 2004).
Indexing Theory. A massive amount of scholarly work (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001;
Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974) shows that even when citizens do engage in democratic practices,
want to be informed and therefore pay attention to political news, they are often, whether
politically educated or not, under the influence of the media and other political actors who
dominate the news discourse. The indexing theory takes as a basic assumption the need of
journalists to quote authoritative sources and argues that as a result, news outputs are a function
of “official” views on a given issue. (Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). Reporters index their
coverage of the range of opinion that exists in the government (Bennett, 1990). If the points of
view of the authoritative sources are dominant in media, public discussion can be highly
dependent on the discursive behavior of political elites. Zaller (1992) and Entman (1993)
maintain that the positions of elite political actors in and out of government define the key
parameters and points of reference in discussion and thought for media and citizens alike. Thus,
these scholars present a ‘top down’ view of the relationship between elite discourse and mass
opinions. Exactly such elite discourse was dominant in Georgian media in 2001-2003 years.
(Sulkhanishvili, 2003; Koplatadze, 2004).
Bennett (1990) and Lawrence (2000) found that dramatic, unsettling news events could
provide journalists with story material while encouraging them to seek out sources that can
contextualize those events. However, according to the theory of indexing, reporters use nonpolitical sources for strengthening the agenda of the political elite (Bennett, 1990). The
Revolution of Roses was providing journalists with exactly such unsettling and dramatic news
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events. Georgian media of that period could seek out not only sources from political elite of the
country, but also from independent experts, ordinary citizens, etc. to provide broad
understanding of the revolution. This study will examine if the reporters referred to non-political
sources for strengthening certain positions of the political elite. The second rule formulated by
Bennett (1996) involves keying a story to disagreements among officials – particularly officials
with the power to affect the outcome of the developing news event. Such conflict serves as a
signal for journalists to expand a story to include the views of experts, social groups, opinion
polls and other sources that reflect the observed differences between powerful politicians.
A study conducted by Kim and Weaver (2003) found results similar to the indexing
theory results. The authors compared news sources in five different countries in 1997 during the
Asian economic crisis. They found that news reporters in all five countries used routine source
channels – press conferences, official proceedings or press releases - more than informal ones –
informal leaks, unofficial interviews, etc. They also found that news reporters quoted more elite
news sources, executives, decision-makers or spokespersons than employees and unaffiliated
individuals. This study is important to the present study of news sources used by two different
Georgian television companies from the perspective of the indexing theory. The current study
will examine whether the Georgian media also indexed news sources to the political elite rather
than ordinary citizens.
Scholars agree that politicians and interest groups try to control the shape and tone of the
debates, because they want to structure outcomes favorable to their political interests (Molotch
& Lester, 1975). “Control over political rhetoric is an essential tool to influence public opinion.”
(Callaghan & Schnell, 2001, p.184). That a party or politician is the winner in the discussion
about a certain policy, which can guide the discussion in a certain direction by means of inserting
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certain terms regarding the issue (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). This is the reason why interest
groups are eager to insert their language and symbols into media coverage of an issue, which can
increase an issue’s visibility, salience and potentially incline the political balance in a group’s
favor (Kollman, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). This is the reason that political parties or
certain politicians prefer certain newspapers or television companies regarding the four crucial
criteria: easy access, a large audience, high credibility and control of the final product (Cook,
1989). This means that the politicians look for coverage in such newspapers, television and radio
companies, which have high ratings, are considered credible and believable and are loyal to those
politicians. Loyalty to a certain politician or a political party more likely guarantees that the
newspaper, television or radio station is eager to have quotes of their favorites more often than
the quotes of less sympathetic politicians and thus, provide their favorites with easy access to the
news outlet. This, in turn, means that the politician will more likely be able to insert his language
– terms and symbols -- into a news story and have the opportunity to convey the message in a
favorable way. This study will scrutinize the language of Georgian media in the coverage of the
protest.
Scholars argue that media too have their own professional standards and commercial and
ideological interests, and in the final stage of production the media itself can have a “mediaconstructed” version of reality (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974; Tuchman, 1972). Blumler and
Gurevitch (1974) discriminate two media models: symbiotic and adversary. They described the
adversary model as a model based on the conflict of interests between politicians and media.
“Politicians should be carefully watched when they abuse their power, exceed their mandates,
commit blunders they would prefer to conceal, and elevate themselves to positions of nonaccountable authority.” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974, p. 470). The authors say that the media has
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symbiotic relations with political actors if there is a reason and possibility of bargaining (Blumler
& Gurevitch, 1974). They provide politicians with access to the public via media in exchange for
information.
Based on Koplatadze’s (2004) findings about the adversary position of Georgian media
during election 2003 coverage toward President Shevardnadze, we might expect the same
tendency to occur regarding the private-owned TV station. Taking into consideration literature
on state-owned media (Siebert et al., 1956, Gibbs, 1999) we might also expect that state TV will
have a symbiotic relationship with the existing government of the country.
Empirical Evidence
The few scholarly works regarding Georgian media mostly examine general development
of a free media system and are less specific in analyzing its particular message strategies (Jones,
2000; Lincoln, 2004; Devdariani, 2004; Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997).
Jones (2000), Lincoln, (2000) and Devdariani (2004) give an overview of Georgia’s
political development from the perspective of establishing the democratic state and mention
Georgian media briefly as an active player in the process. Bokeria and his colleagues (1997)
present data on Georgian media, their infrastructure, give an overview of the law regarding the
media, and give examples of media restraints enacted by the government of Georgia. These
articles are based mostly on interviews with politicians, media representatives, experts and
interest groups (Jones, 2000), existing political data and personal observations (Devdariani,
2004, Lincoln, 2004). Bokeria and colleagues collect more comprehensive data on Georgian
media, but none of the articles study in depth media production and news programs in particular.
They address more general economic, political and legal frameworks of Georgian media, rather
than analyze any particular media product.
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However, some works can be found that scrutinize frames and sources or general
characteristics of different types of media in the post-Soviet region. For example, Romania,
Russia and Poland, like Georgia, are countries that underwent similar development from
communist autocracies toward established democracies. Hypothetically, it may be true that
media in these countries have some similar characteristics.
For example, Gross (1999) gives six characteristics of Romanian media in 1996-2000
that resemble some characteristics of Georgian media. As Gross (1999) argues, the media and
journalists generally fail to serve as models of democratic beliefs and values. He claims that
“journalism (a) contributes to suspicions about democracy; (b) often increases rather than
decreases the intolerance for opposing parties, beliefs and preferences; (c) does not contribute to
an atmosphere that increases willingness to compromise with political opponents or that
enhances pragmatism and flexibility; (d) increases mistrust of the political environment and
cooperation; (e) does nothing to encourage moderation in political position and partisan
identification or civility in political discourse; and (f) contributes little to political efficiency and
participation” (Gross, 1999, p. 23).
Lipman and McFaul (2001) studied how the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, treated
the independent Russian media, and in particular the television company NTV. They analyze
Putin’s actions and speeches from the perspective of understanding the concept of free and
independent press. They also describe the NTV coverage of the Chechen War and parliamentary
and presidential elections in Russia to provide a better understanding of the context and
background of Putin’s reactions. In Russia, as in many emerging democracies, independent press
often became a synonym for oppositional press (Gross, 1996, Coman, 2000). This happened to
the independent television company NTV. NTV’s director general, Igor Malashenko, crossed the
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border between political campaigning and media when he became one of the members of thenpresident Boris Yeltsin’s reelection team without resigning from his television post. He
encouraged the television company to give positive coverage to Yeltsin and very critical
reporting of the leader of the Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov, the opposing candidate
during the campaign. (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p.119). The researchers see the partisanship of
Russian media as an effort toward “keeping communists out of power” and “protecting their
survival as an independent media.” (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p.119). The authors conclude that
because of the nonexistence of an independent judiciary system or popular support of a free
Russian press, the effort of one TV company was not enough to protect the right of free speech
and Putin was able to control private Russian media.
Goban-Klas (1997) emphasized a similar inclination in Polish media. He argues that
media in Poland is partisan and this partisanship reflects inherent social tensions and competing
political groups’ perceptions that in the struggle for power media have become “the main
instrument for politics. Their vision of the media is one-dimensional, over-politicized and
simplified, believing in a missionary role for journalists and an ideologized press.” (Goban-Klas,
1997, p. 37).
The importance of political elite news sources is stressed in Ellis’s (1999) study of
Russian media. The author argues that “the primary function of mass media in Russia is not to
attract and hold large audiences for advertisers, but to attract and hold large audiences for
individual politicians, who either control or strive to control the mass media.” (Ellis, 1999,
p.104). This particular finding is important to the present study, because during the Revolution of
Roses, it was extremely important for politicians to have the support of citizens and their best
tool for this was the Georgian private media (Lincoln, 2004, Devdariani, 2004).
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The results of monitoring Russian television news during the campaign periods for the
1995 Duma campaign and the 1996 presidential race show that state-owned and privately-owned
TV companies generally failed to contribute fully to the legitimization of the electoral process
(Oates & Roselle, 2000). During the parliamentary campaign, state-controlled Russian Public
Television (ORT) focused on pro-government parties and neglected coverage of the competition.
Although the election coverage on the private NTV station was more balanced, the elections
were relatively ignored in favor of aggressive coverage of the war in Chechnya. By the 1996
presidential election, the two stations both abandoned the pretense of neutrality to promote the
presidential candidacy of Boris Yeltsin. “What emerges from this study is evidence of a missed
opportunity to consolidate the growth of an independent media in Russia—and the failure of
voters to obtain disinterested information from primary television outlets in a fragile
democracy.” (Oates & Roselle, 2000, p.30). The present study will examine if the same path
occurred regarding Georgian TV companies.
The reason for the weak role of Russian media in facilitating the process of democracy is
that the development of social groups and organizations, especially political parties and interest
groups, is very fragmented and fragile. (Symon, 2004; Skyner, 2003). They were unable to create
strong opposition voices. This absence of a strong opposition made it difficult for the Russian
media to find opposition voices to balance the point of view of Putin and to maintain the freedom
of expression in Russian media. That is why the Russian media tend to present favorable images
of the president and his majority party in the Parliament (Skyner, 2003, Symon, 2004).
In Georgia, on the contrary, civil society and free media are allied, and whenever the
media is in trouble, civil society tries to support it. For example, when the government attempted
to close down the independent television company Rustavi2 in 2001, Georgian civil society
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created street protests and tried to protect freedom of expression (Sulkhanishvili, 2003). On the
other hand, knowing that its very existence depended on a strong civil society, the independent
media promoted the values of a strong civil society. For example, Koplatadze’s (2004) study of
election 2003 coverage in Georgian media concludes that both journalists and reformers
understood that fabrication of the election would weaken the establishment of democracy in
Georgia. They were aware that only a united effort by the media and civil society could stop the
government from fabricating the election. The researcher said that this was the reason why a
symbiotic relationship was formed between the media and the opposition. The peaceful
resignation of President Shevardnadze indicated that their goal was achieved (Koplatadze, 2004).
The present study will test the following four hypotheses:
H1a: The prime-time stories on the news program of the state-owned television company
had more sources from the representatives or/and supporters of the ruling party than from the
reformers.
H1b: The prime-time stories on the news program of the private-owned television
company had more sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers than from
the ruling party.
These hypotheses are derived from the indexing theory that suggests that the media is
indexing its sources to the political elite. (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Blumler & Gurevitch,
1974; Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). The state-owned media repeats the position of the
government and the independent media strengthens the position of the opposition (Oates &
Roselle, 2000).
H2a: The state-owned television company used more pro-governmental keywords and
terms than pro-reform keywords.
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H2b: The private-owned television company used more anti-governmental keywords than
pro-government keywords.
The indexing theory also suggests that politicians and several interest groups try to
control the shape and tone of the debates, because they want to structure outcomes favorable to
their political interests (Callaghan et al., 2001). This is the reason why interest groups are eager
to insert their language and symbols into media coverage of an issue, which can increase an
issue’s visibility, salience and potentially incline the political balance in a group’s favor
(Kollman, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
H3: The private-owned and state-owned TV channels framed the protest differently.
Framing theory suggests that by framing, journalists are giving meaning to an issue.
Journalists are presenting different realities by providing different highlights, different selections
of sources, issues, stories and pictures (Entman, 1993; Schudson, 2003).
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
In order to analyze how Georgian independent and state-owned media’s prime time news
programs differed during the period of crisis in the country, the researcher used a content
analysis. According to Kellinger (1986), a content analysis enables the researcher to study
“communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring
variables” (Kellinger in Wimmer & Dominick, 2000, p.135). This study employs a descriptive
content analysis rather than an inferential one, because of the small number of the news stories;
there were 250 prime-time news stories aired on the two TV programs during the protests, so it
was feasible to study the entire universe of stories and sampling was not necessary. The
descriptive content analyses also are “reality checks, whereby portrayal of groups, phenomena,
traits, or characteristics are assessed against a standard taken from real life…. Moreover,
descriptive content analyses sometimes serve as a prelude to other types of research, often in
domains not previously explored” (Riffe, 1998, p.10). The method is best for the research
questions because Georgian media and in particular its behavior during the protests are not wellresearched fields, and descriptive content analysis can help assess the situation by applying
standard indicators to the behavior of TV companies in this particular case.
Several important factors determine the choice of news programs of the state-owned and
one of the independent television stations. The President of Georgia and his election bloc “For
New Georgia” together with the opposition parties constantly accused the independent television
of framing the event in a certain way (Shengelia, November 2003; Khoperia, 2003).
Shevardnadze and his counterparts were blaming this television for being a mouthpiece for the
reformers (Shengelia, November 2003). They said that independent television showed and
quoted only governmental opposition. Nobody had any kind of arguments against two other
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independent television companies: Imedi TV and Mze. The reformers accused state television of
being a puppet in the hands of Shevardnadze (Khoperia, 2003). They said that state-owned
television showed and quoted only the president and his supporters (Khoperia, 2003). The study
is interested in examining these television stations because of the degree of polarized attitudes
towards them. The selection of these two TV stations gives us a good possibility to analyze what
degree of access each TV company granted to the sources, and if they give the sources the
possibility to control the final product. Also, television news is more likely than other media to
assist citizens in forming opinions on the candidates and the issues (Hennessey, 1985), and more
so during crisis, when demand for simultaneous information is high and citizens are more likely
to depend on media. (Ball Rockeach & DeFleur, 1976). The private TV company, afterwards, in
its promotional ads referred to itself as “the television of winners.”
The study covers 44 prime-time news programs aired in the evening hours, generally
between 7 and 11 P.M., when the largest television audience is available, between the 2nd and 23rd
of November 2003. Elections took place on 2nd of November 2003. This was also the date when
Georgian reformers, their supporters and non-governmental organizations started to protest the
results of voting. The 23rd of November was the date when the old government was replaced by
the reformers. Because of the nature of the prime-time news programs, each TV company tried
to air what was, in their opinion, the most important and interesting information. So it is a good
possibility to look at the news sources and event frames in these programs in order to see what
the preferences of each newscast were.
The unit of analysis of the present study is the news story. All stories from 22 stateowned station’s news programs and from 22 news programs of the independent television station
were analyzed. In order to examine what kind of sources reporters used and how they used them,
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the researcher reduced the categories of sources into the supporters of the president and his party
and the supporters of the opposing “National Movement” and “Burjanadze - the Democrats”
parties and their allies. Other factions were eliminated because they were less influential and not
competitive during the studied period. The first group includes President Eduard Shevardnadze,
Prime Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze, active representatives Irine Sarishvili, Levan Mamaladze,
Vitali Khazaradze, plus any local, foreign expert, media representative, ordinary citizen, etc. that
expressed the view of the bloc For New Georgia - that elections were fair and the protests were
organized not for justice, but for the demands of certain politicians who wanted power or were
interested in creating destabilization in the country. The supporters of reform include sources
from the representatives of reformers: Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Jvania and
Koba Davitashvili, plus non-governmental organizations, media, experts, and anybody who
expressed their view that the results were not fair and that the government violated the rights of
voters.
The researcher also identified keywords for each side of the event, based on terms
appearing frequently in news stories. The terms used to involve frames and keywords in this
study constituted frequent words, phrases and themes identified by the researcher in a close
reading of the texts. The following keywords were determined as pro-governmental:
1) “Manipulated people”- This term is often used for blaming certain politicians for
manipulating the public to protest government, using the public to achieve their political ends,
and therefore emphasizing the weakness of public opinion. It refers to the idea that people would
not protest the results of the Central Election Committee on their own and would only do so if
someone made them do so. An example is: “A small amount of manipulated people are gathering
in front of the Parliament;” “Jvania is using young people to achieve his goals.”
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2) “Civil war/bloodshed/chaos/destabilization” – Terms are used to identify
demonstrations and people gathering as a reason for future civil war and bloodshed. The
opposition is accused of splitting Georgian public into two adversary groups who will defend
themselves by means of arms, and bloodshed will be inevitable. Each appearance of these words
should be coded. Example: “in 1992 we experienced what this kind of destabilization causes. We
don’t want one more civil war, one more bloodshed.”
3) “Motivation/will of coming into power” - Oppositional politicians were accused of
opposing the government and the results of the election because their motivation was to take
power. Example: “Jvania is opposing the official results of the 2nd November because he wants
to come to power. Unlike the results of exit polls ordered by him, the results of the Central
Election Committee show it is possible that he will stay out of the Parliament.”
4) “Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections/Fair elections
since Shevardnadze” - Governmental sources were claiming that overall the elections were fair,
but had some minor violations that did not affect the final outcome. Example: “Despite the
minor violations, in whole, the 2nd November elections were the most fair elections of the past
years.”
5) Call for negotiation and agreement - The president often stressed that he was eager to
meet the organizers of the protests and calls for negotiations. By doing so, he stressed that
despite his efforts the opposition was radical and unwilling to start the dialogue. Example: “I was
waiting for Jvania and others yesterday. They promised to come, but did not show up.”
6) Other – the researcher tried to include every key word or the key term in analyses, but
to avoid missing something the coding sheet had this category to specify if there was any
keyword or term that did not match the above-mentioned categories.
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The sources were defined as follows:
Supporters of the ruling party includes only those celebrities, official representatives of
foreign countries, local and foreign experts, local and foreign media who/which made statements
supporting the ruling party.
Supporters of the reformers include only those celebrities, official representatives of
foreign countries, local and foreign experts, local and foreign media who/which made statements
supporting the reformers. More specific categories are explained in detail in the code book
created for the present study. See appendix B.
During the close watching of the programs, the researcher found that the reformers
frequently used the following keywords and phrases:
1) Worthy people: opposition used the term to say that people taking part in
demonstration are worthy people who came out into the streets to defend their dignity, and their
dignity was defined as a right to vote and a right to have a better life. “Georgians are worthy
people. They won’t let the government ignore their choice.”
2) The will of Georgian people/peaceful protest: supporters of opposition often used the
term to define manifestations and demonstrations against the government as the will of people
who were defending their rights. Example: “The Government is neglecting the will of Georgian
people, who are standing in front of the Parliament, despite the rain, wind and cold, to defend
their voice.” The protests were often defined as a peaceful way of changing the government.
Example: “Our protest is peaceful. We will stand firm, but peacefully;” “The Georgian people
thought that the elections were the means of replacing the government peacefully. Shevardnadze
ignored this. He is ignoring the demands of Georgian people. We don’t want to have such
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government. Join us in a peaceful protest, in a peaceful way of replacing the existing
government.”
3) Fair battle: opposition and their supporters defined demonstrations as a fair battle for
defense of the right to vote and fair results of elections. Example: “This is a fair battle to defend
our voices.”
4) Falsification of elections/election lists/Violation of election rights: the news coverage
during this period was mainly concerned with the results of the elections. Many sources were
claiming that elections were dramatically falsified and this very falsification was the reason that
people went out into the streets. Example: “It is evident that the results of the elections are totally
fabricated in order to falsify the elections.” Often the protesters said Shevardnadze and the
alliance For the New Georgia violated the rights of voters to ensure their own victory. Example:
“Shevardnadze violated the election rights of the voter, he took away our voices and by doing so,
his party obtained the first place.”
5) “Necessity for the government’s resignation:” This phrase was mostly used by
opposition sources to claim that there was no way for the government to stay in power and it
must resign. This term stresses high responsibility for the government in the conflict. Example:
“The Georgian people could stand the cold, the dark, the starvation, but it could not stand the
violation of its dignity. The Government has no right to stay in power. We demand its
unconditional resignation.”
6) Other: In regard to avoid missing any key words in favor of protesters and against the
government and was not included in the above-mentioned categories, here the coders specify it.
Four dominant frames were used that were identified in previous framing studies
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). They are: responsibility, conflict, human interest and economic
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consequences frame. The recent studies of Georgian media (Sulkhanishvili, 2003; Koplatadze,
2004) indicated that morality frame was not typical in Georgian media, so they were not
considered as an important frame for the present study. For identifying the correct frame, each
sentence within each news story was coded.
The responsibility frame portrayed an issue or problem in a way that attributed causality
to a certain political party or group. “The chief of the local election committee himself closed the
election district and deprived the voters to vote;” ”If the government wants public reaction, it
will receive the public reaction;” “If the president was able to listen to your voices earlier, you
would not be standing here now.”
The conflict frame was defined as emphasizing disagreement or differences of opinion
between the alliance For New Georgia and the opposition, and also within these opposing
groups. Example: “Saakashvili doesn’t like the methods of Burjanadze. Burjanadze doesn’t like
his radical tone;” “Disagreement within the positions of the members of party “For New
Georgia” regarding the negotiations with opposition is obvious;” “We exhausted all resources
and possibilities of agreement. The president is not willing to yield to his own people.”
The economic consequences frame was defined as focusing on the financial aspects or impact it
might have on an individual, group, institution, region, or the whole country. Example: “During
these days, the economic index of the country became worse;” “The protests ruin the country’s
economy.”
The coding of content was conducted according to the procedures described by Riffe
(1998). The author and a PhD student in mathematics coded the stories. They were the only two
Georgian speakers at the university where the study was conducted. To ensure the accuracy of
coding procedures and its results, the coders trained for a month. They coded 20 percent of the
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stories together until consensus was reached, problems worked out, and categories refined. After
reaching consensus, the coders coded separately the remainder of the stories. All categories were
ratio measures, because the coders counted the number of times each category occurred.
For calculating inter-coder reliability the researcher used Pearson correlations for interval
data. The researcher counted the number of times something occurred. Pearson’s correlations
were obtained as follows: supporters of the ruling party r = 1.0, p < .01; supporters of the
reformers r = .88, p < .01; other sources in this category r = .91, p < .05; representatives of the
ruling party conveying and supporting party statements r = .98, p < .01; representatives of the
reformers conveying and supporting statements of the reformers and their allies r = .87, p < .01;
ordinary citizens supporting the ruling party r = .84; p < .05; ordinary citizens supporting the
reformers r = .93; p < .01; the ruling party supporter political parties r = .88, p < .01; the
reformers supporter political parties r = 1.0, p < .01; p < .01; political parties supporting neither
of them or particular statements from both of them r = .86, p < .01; representatives of the central
election committee supporting the ruling party r = 1.0; p < .01; representatives of the central
election committee supporting the reformers r =; p <; manipulated people r = 1.0, p < .01; worthy
people r = .87, p < .05; civil war/chaos/bloodshed r = .83, p < .01; peaceful protest r = .81, p <
.01; motivation of coming into power r = .95, p < .05; fair battle r = 1.0; p < .01; fair
elections/fair elections with minor violations r = .97, p < .01; falsified elections r = .95, p < .01;
call for negotiation r = .94, p < .01; necessity of Shevardnadze’s resignation r = .98; p < .01;
frame of responsibility r = .87, p < .01; conflict frame r = .95, p < .01; frame of economic
subsequences r = .94, p < .01. Human-interest frame did not occur during the training process of
the coder, so it was not coded during the actual coding. Because this study is primarily concerned
with describing content rather than generalizing, data will be analyzed using percentages.
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES
Overall, there were 252 news stories covering Revolution of Roses in both state-owned
and private-owned television companies. The independent television station aired 147 stories; the
state-owned television station aired 105 stories. Both television companies indexed their sources
to representatives of political elite – Georgian government including the president and his party
and opposition parties: 61 % of the state-owned television sources came from ruling party and
reformers representatives; the independent television station had 75 % of ruling party and
reformers representatives; (Table 1). Similarity of source categories are obvious, however there
is a difference within the categories regarding supporters of each opposing parties. (Table 2).
TABLE 1: Percentages of source categories (supporters of the ruling party as well as supporters
of the reformers) in state-owned and independent station:
Sources
State-owned Station % Independent Station %
Political Elite – Ruling Party and

61

75

34

38

22

25

Ordinary Citizens

19

18

Representatives of Central Election

12

15

Reformers Representatives
Media, Foreign Countries’
Representatives, Local Experts and
Celebrities
Representatives of Other Political
Parties

Committee and its regional Branches
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TABLE 2: Percentages of sources within each category in state-owned and independent TV
company:
Ruling party supporters%
Reformers supporters %
Sources

Number of local

State-owned

Independent

State-owned

Independent

television %

Television %

television %

television %

27

5

8

33

a) 48

a) 34

b) 13

b) 41

15

3

4

22

19

12

3

7

11

9

1

7

5

3

1

1

celebrities and experts,
foreign country’s
representatives, media
sources
Number of
representatives of a) the
ruling party and b) the
reformers
Number of ordinary
citizens
Number of other
political parties
Number of
representatives of
central election
committee
Number of other
sources
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This study also measured the statements by these sources aired by each television
company. It found that 81% of the state-owned television station news stories had progovernment key-words; Most frequent- 52 % - was a term framing the protests as a real danger
of creating “civil war, bloodshed, destabilization or chaos” in the country; then came
Shevardnadze’s “call for negotiations” to resolve the conflict – 44 %;
On the independent TV company, 78 % of stories had anti-government key words. The
most frequently used was the term falsification of elections/election lists – 56 % conveying the
message that Georgian citizens were deprived of the right to vote; then followed “peaceful
protest/will of Georgian people” – 49 %, stressing that the protests were expression of the
people’s will and it was peaceful. (Table 3).
TABLE 3: Percentages of pro-governmental and anti-governmental key-words in each
TV Company:
Pro-governmental keyState Indep. Anti-governmental keyState Indep.
words

%

%

words

%

%

Civil war, bloodshed,

52

19

Falsification of

21

56

16

49

destabilization or chaos
Call for negotiation

elections/election lists
44

18

Peaceful protest/will of
Georgian people

Fair elections with

36

18

Fair battle

10

33

15

3

Call for resignation of

6

26

11

19

minor violations
Motivation of coming
into power
Manipulated people

president Shevardnadze
9

3

Worthy people
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State-owned and Independent television framed the Revolution of Roses differently.
(Table 4). Overall, 61 % of news stories on both television stations quoted ruling party
supporters, 55 % supporters of the reformers. Only 29 % were sources not supporting any of the
parties. 55 % of the stories aired pro-governmental key words and terms and 62 % were antigovernmental key words. The least frequent frame in both news programs was the frame of
economic consequences - 11 %.
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS
H1a: The prime-time stories in the news program of the state-owned television company
had more sources from the representatives or/and supporters of the ruling party than the
reformers.
This hypothesis was supported. Seventy-five percent of the state television’s stories had
sources from representatives and/or supporters of the ruling party; 26% of its stories had sources
from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers.
H1b: The prime-time stories in the news program of the private-owned television
company had more sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers than from
the ruling party.
This hypothesis was supported. 75% of the private-owned television company’s stories
contained sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers; 52% of its stories
used sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the ruling party.
H2a: The state-owned television company used more pro-governmental keywords and
terms than pro-reform keywords.
This hypothesis was supported. The state-owned television used pro-governmental
keywords and terms in 81% of its stories; 40% of its stories had pro-reformers key-words.
H2b: The private-owned television company used more anti-governmental keywords than
pro-government words.
This hypothesis was supported. The private-owned television used anti-governmental key
words in 78% of its stories; 38% of the stories had pro-governmental key-words.
H3: The private-owned and state-owned TV channels framed the protest differently.
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This hypothesis was supported. The most frequent frame of the protest coverage in the
state-owned television was the responsibility frame; 73% of the state television stories were
framed as issues of responsibility; 68% were conflict frames and 22% were frames of economic
consequences. The most frequent frame of the protest coverage in the private owned television
company was conflict - 88% of its stories contained this frame. The second most prevalent frame
was the responsibility frame - 68% of the stories had this frame; and only 3% of the stories had
frames of economic consequences. (Table 4).
TABLE 4: Percentages of frames in state-owned and independent TV Company:
Frames
Independent television %
State-owned television %
Responsibility

68

73

Conflict

88

68

Economic consequences

3
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
Both TV stations failed to provide a forum for the public discussion where all voices can
participate without serious limitations. According to the indexing theory, they both indexed their
coverage to the opinion of the political elite. Two major political groups were fighting with each
other for power during the Revolution of Roses. The president and the ruling party “For the New
Georgia” represented one group and the reformers and their parties - “National movement” and
“Burjanadze – the Democrats” represented the other. Georgian state-owned and independent
television companies quoted more frequently exactly these political groups: the president and
representatives of his ruling party and the representatives of reformers. However, there were
differences. In particular, state-owned television company had many more stories that quoted
sources from the ruling party than the opposition and the private-owned television company had
more stories that quoted sources from the opposition. Thus, each television company chose a
different communication model with the president and his party. The state-owned television used
the exchange model with the president of the country and its supporters, mainly the ruling party.
The sources, in this case the president and his supporters, were providing the state-owned
television’s journalists with desired material, often exclusives in exchange for access and
favorable coverage. To the contrary, the independent television maintained the adversary model
of relationships with the president and his party. Thus, both television companies, by choosing
the different models of relationships with the president and his party, were presenting a polarized
picture of reality.
Despite their different approach to the protests both stations selected their news sources
from a similar circle of political actors. However, they chose different representatives of these
spheres: state-owned television, to strengthen the position of the ruling party, chose celebrities,
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experts and media who supported the ruling party. The independent television, on the contrary,
chose those sources that strengthened the position of the reformers. The difference was found in
the frequency of those political parties which were not representing directly any of the
conflicting sides: The New Rights, Labor Party, Industry Saves Georgia, Revival Union, Ertoba.
The state-owned television quoted representatives of these parties more frequently than the
independent one. This has several explanations, both ideological and practical. The study found
that sources included in this category and labeled as “other political parties” mainly made
statements supporting the president and his party. So, ideologically, the state television repeated
its main approach to protest coverage and chose to quote “other political parties” more often than
the independent station did to strengthen the position of the ruling party. Independent television
might have also has had a practical reason. This television company had problems with these
sources because they were boycotting the independent television company, saying they were
covering the protests in a way preferable to the reformers.
Despite the obvious partisanship of the state and independent media, the independent
television was somewhat more balanced in referring to the ruling party’s and reformers’
representatives: The state-owned television’s proportion of references to ruling party
representatives and reformers representatives was consistently more skewed than independent
television. For example, state TV referred to the ruling party 48 % of the time and reformers 13
% of the time, while independent TV referred to the ruling party 34% of the time versus 41%
references to reformers. The difference in selection of sources by independent television was not
as great as by state-owned television. The difference might have been even less if the
representatives of the ruling party and their supporters did not boycott the private-owned
television company. The boycott became the reason that journalists of independent television
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could not interview the ruling party representatives and their supporters. Political parties who
were allies of the ruling party - The New Rights, Labor Party, Industry Saves Georgia, Revival
Union – held a joint press conference on November 11 after the first week of the protest, and
announced the boycott of independent television. They said the reason for the boycott was that
the station had non-stop coverage of the protest that was a promotion of the event. Another
reason for the boycott, they said, was that the station referred more often to the reformers and
their supporters than to the opposing politicians. The ruling party representatives offered no
official announcements of a boycott, but they were ignoring questions of journalists from the
independent station at the briefings and press conferences. They also tried to get rid of their
cameras when the independent station’s journalists attempted to interview them in front of their
office, in the street, in the parliament building, etc.
The indexing theory could explain this evidence. As the theory suggests, journalists need
to quote authoritative sources. Such official sources in the government were the ruling party
representatives, not the reformers. Also, the final resolution of the conflict depended more on the
political will of the ruling party to admit that reformers won the elections. So the journalists and
the public were interested in hearing their positions. Thus, the independent station looked for
them and was eager to refer to them, while the state-owned television station did not have any
“need” to quote the reformers, who were considered as organizers of disorder.
The preferences and partisanship of each television station was more straightforward in
selection of celebrities and experts: in state television the proportion of stories referring to the
ruling party supporter celebrities was 27% and the reformer supporter celebrities was 8%; in
independent television the same proportion was 5% ruling party supporters to 33% reform party
supporters. The same trend of unbalanced sources is obvious in the rest of categories. (See table
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2). The partisanship of these television stations was obvious also in usage of the key words and
thematic clusters. (See Table 3). The key words expressing or strengthening the position or point
of view of the government occurred more often in state-owned than independent television. Antigovernmental key terms were more prevalent on the private-owned television company.
Analyses of the key words and thematic clusters highlighted an important issue. The independent
television organized its coverage of the Revolution of Roses around the reason of the protests
being the falsification of elections. By stressing that elections were falsified and voters’ rights
violated, the television station called citizens to mobilize and defend their rights. The protests
became a representation of the will of the whole Georgian people. Thus, the meaning and
importance of the protests were magnified and framed as a fair battle for justice. The state
television station, on the contrary, was organizing its coverage around the protests itself. The
news program was trying to discredit the protest by associating it with civil war, destabilization
and chaos. But at the same time, the station was calling the opposition for negotiations. Stating
that the protests were the result of the outcome of the elections was only the third most frequent
key word. However, the elections were called fair and legitimate. This means that the
independent station aimed at mobilization of citizens by emphasizing that elections were
tampered with. The state television station, on the contrary, aimed at discrediting the revolution
by saying that the elections were fair and the leaders of the protests were denying the election
outcome only because they were motivated by the desire to gain power.
Shevardnadze and the ruling party, by framing the elections as “fair elections” and a
protest as “gathering of manipulated people” attributed responsibility for the possible
consequences to the reformers that led the protests. The responsibility frame was one of the most
prevailing media frames in the state-owned television. According to the ruling party messages

40

that were repeated in the state television’s newscasts the protests would lead to “a civil war,
bloodshed and chaos” in the country. The ruling party supporters said the reformers were
“motivated to come to power” and did not respond to the president’s “call for negotiation” to
resolve the conflict - the second most frequent frame on state television. In the opinion of the
ruling party supporters, the reformers were facilitating the economic impediment of the country the third most frequent frame on state television. The independent television station took a stand
for reformers, even became active political partner of the reformers and supported democratic
changes in the country by certain means. For example, the station neglected the frame of heavy
economic consequences of the protests offered by the government and repeated on state
television to prevent the spread of the protests. This frame was presented in only 2% of the
stories on the independent station. Also the station emphasized the conflict - the most prevalent
frame (88%) - between civil society and Shevardnadze’s government, which failed to
acknowledge defeat in elections, and tried to remain in power. They did it by using such thematic
clusters as: at the “peaceful protests” “worthy people” were expressing their “will” that
“Shevardnadze’s government’s resignation was a necessity.” The station attributed the
responsibility - the second most frequent frame occurring in 68% of the stories in independent
television - for this conflict to the government, which “tampered with the elections” and
“violated election rights” of the citizens.
Thus the evidence shows that the state-owned television company favored the state
position in every way – the number and kinds of sources, the frames and the key words. The
private-owned television company did the opposite – favored the opposition by the same means:
sources, frames and key words.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The study provides evidence that by framing elections and protests in a different way,
political players and media professionals define and give different meanings to the same issues
and suggest what is at issue. Thus each party of the political elite tried to promote their own
political viewpoints. By preferring sources from the ruling party and their supporters and
repeating frames and key words suggested by the ruling party, state television supported
Shevardnadze and his party. To the contrary, by quoting more frequently reformers and their
supporters and framing the event in a way offered by the reformers, the independent media
supported the viewpoints of the reformers. Several reasons may explain why coverage of the
event was so biased by these television companies. One of the reasons might be the normal
journalistic routines within each medium. The state television throughout its history was facing
the hegemony of the ruling party. In the Communist era it was the party, while in the
independent era it was the president of the country. It became very difficult and even impossible
to overcome its heavy heritage even during the turbulent period of large-scale protests. To
overcome these problems, today, the new government of the country is reorganizing state
television into a public broadcasting operation. Several groups in Georgian society, including
non-governmental organizations, nominated candidates for public broadcasting’s board of
supervisors. The parliament selected and appointed nine board members, who among other
things were responsible for selecting the director of the public radio and Television Company,
who has to be independent at least from the obvious influence of any political party. This
election was crucial for the new public television, and old problems were still apparent. The
board was unable to select a candidate in the first round because of in- fighting over candidates’
loyalties. The board members said that none of the short listed candidates had significant
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experience in management of a big company. Lasha Bakradze, one of the candidates on the short
list, said that the board was looking for the candidate who was loyal to the new government, in
particular, the president and his National Movement party. In the second round, one of the most
influential members of the new public television’s board, Tamar Kintsurashvili, was elected.
Besides being a board member, she also is the close relative of Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders
of the National Movement. Almost all of the candidates said that the new director of public
television was not selected objectively and the ruling National Movement influenced and
interfered in the process. Lia Mukhashavria, one of the candidates, even appealed to the courts,
saying that it was illegal for the board to appoint as director one of its own members. Gia Nodia,
a public TV board member, admitted that Kintsurashvili also does not have any significant
experience in management, which was the reason given for denying the previous candidates.
This happened under the new government led by the reformers, even though it looks like
something one would expect from the previous government. Thus, it is hardly believable that the
process of transformation of state television into public broadcasting will be successful. Nobody
can insist that the public television will definitely be transformed into a medium free from the
government’s pressure.
From the day it was founded, the independent television station performed the function of
watchdog of the government; because of this, it gained popularity in the country. During the
protests the television company took it to extremes. The independent station became an active
ally of the opposition while it was in the process of changing the existing government. The
independent station was not an impartial information provider; it was as biased as state
television.
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It was essential for Georgia at that time to have a media that functioned as a watchdog.
The reformers, local and international experts monitoring the elections, and citizens who were
trying to participate in elections and make a difference in the country despite the obstacles such
as insufficient election lists, were insisting that the election process was full of violations.
(Khoperia, 2003; Shengelia, 2003). The experts had plenty of evidence of violations such as
election reports that were fabricated so that it was easy for ordinary citizens to trace (Khoperia,
2003). Parallel vote count results and exit polls showed similar outcomes - the National
Movement party won the elections (Report of Fair Elections, 2003). Yet the official government
version was that the president and his party were the winners (Report of Central Election
Committee, 2003). People who were ready to change the government peacefully put a lot of
effort and energy into doing so, including standing in long lines on Election Day. Before the
elections, they made sure they were on the lists of voters, and called the Central Election
Committee and wrote requests if they were not on the lists (Shengelia, 2003; Khoperia, 2003).
The turnout was heavy – 95% (Report of Central Election Committee, 2003; Report of Fair
Elections, 2003). They did all this in hopes of ending the corruption in the country and
improving living conditions while enjoying democracy and freedom. Instead, the president told
them they were wrong. Their votes do not matter. The opinions of local and foreign experts do
not matter. The only thing that matters is the will of the government to stay in power. In this
case, as in case of the social movements in U.S., the media need to create the means for largescale communication, to take a more active, even participatory role to help reformers find their
way to the public and help the public unite for justice, democracy and freedom. State television
failed to fulfill this goal, while independent television took on the burden.
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This participatory position of the independent station is applauded by developmental
theory. The theory suggests that media in countries facing a transition from autocracy toward
established democracy have to facilitate the promotion of democratic values and take a political
stand to move the country toward democracy. In the case of Georgia, opposition and their
supporters were considered to be democrats and eager to fulfill democratic reforms.
The developmental theory has much in common also with Mindich’s (1998) position. In
such a critical and fragile time for democracy as Georgia faced in November of 2003, a
responsible journalist must offer something more than passive “objectivity.” (Mindich, 1998). A
journalist should take a stand for civil rights, democracy and a country’s development by giving
civic voices access to the public, to move the country toward the establishment of the values of
democracy. Despite the fact that there were not many “citizen’s voices” in the coverage of the
Revolution of Roses, and instead there were the voices of the opposing political elite, it was
these politicians who were expressing the position of Georgia’s citizens. This became obvious
during the protests, and afterwards, when the majority of Georgian citizens voted for the
National Movement and Burjanadze the Democrats - the leaders of the revolution - and Mikheil
Saakashvili was elected president in 2004.
However, another way of looking at the problem is through the lens of Free Press Theory.
Bias is against all professional norms of journalism, regardless of whether the bias is for the
“right” or “wrong” side of the issue. A free press has to offer balanced, fair and objective
accounts of the event or issue. Otherwise, it will not have the trust of the public, which is most
valuable to a free press. One of the premises upon which the reforms in Georgia are founded is to
gain more freedom of expression for everyone, using the Western press as a model. The
coverage of the Revolution of Roses in the independent station was not conducive to the
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development of a free press. It becomes even more obvious how important an unbiased press is
now that the former reformers have become the government. The independent television
company not only abandoned its watchdog function, but became part of the government’s public
relations machine by conveying mostly positive news about the policymakers and policies. So,
after the former political opposition became the majority in the Government, the independent
television continues symbiotic relationship with them. The state owned television also continues
its regular routine – conveying the point of view of whoever is in the majority of the government.
The government became more severe to free media. They are using well the obvious fact that the
majority of Georgian journalists do not have that high standard of professionalism as their
western counterparts have and the professional unions of journalists and other media
representatives are very week. They attack the media whenever there is a story criticizing the
government from the perspective of professionalism of the journalists. Their methods are more
sophisticated then Shevardnadze’s methods were. Also they are well using public relation
strategies for conveying convenient for them messages to public via media channels who support
them. Looking from this perspective it would be interesting to elaborate and add to the existing
field of media theory the new theory, which will well describe and explain the condition and
development of media in countries in transition, such as Georgia is. In this country the current
stage of media development is the mix of developmental and authoritative theories.
For true facilitation of reforms and democracy, the media needs to be truly independent,
fair and unbiased, providing the public with objective and sufficient information in order to give
them the opportunity to reach informed and enlightened decisions upon which democracy is
based. The present study gives evidence that both state-owned and independent media failed to
do this during the Revolution of Roses.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
The present study cannot be generalized to Georgian media because it is limited to one
particular event and only two television companies. For a better understanding of the journalistic
routines of each television station a qualitative approach can be helpful. Particularly, interviews
with the journalists as well as program managers and editors can better highlight communication
strategies of each medium.
The sample of television companies also can be broadened by researching the other two
private commercial television stations in order to have a better understanding of how the
Georgian media and television companies in particular covered the protests.
Further research on the development of Georgian independent media after the Revolution
of Roses can bring to light whether the Georgian independent media in general and not only
during a crisis, is indeed able to maintain freedom from external restraints and achieve the
freedom to facilitate universal values and general principles of democracy.
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APPENDIX A: CODING SHEET
Coder:
Godi 1

nino 2

News Program:
Moambe 1

Kurieri 2

Date
Story ID
SOURCES
SUPPORTERS OF THE
RULING PARTY
Number of local celebrities and
experts, foreign country’s
representatives, media sources
Number of representatives of the
ruling party

SUPPORTERS OF
REFORMERS
Number of local celebrities and
experts, foreign country’s
representatives, media sources
Number of representatives of the
reformers

Other

Number of ordinary citizens

Number of ordinary citizens

Number of ordinary citizens

Number of other political parties

Number of other political parties

Number of other political parties

Number of representatives of
central election committee

Number of representatives of
central election committee

Number of representatives of
central election committee

Number of other sources

Number of other sources

Number of other sources
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Number of local celebrities and
experts, foreign country’s
representatives, media sources
Number of representatives of
ruling party or reformers

Key Words and Terms (count every time the key-word appears using the hash marks):
PROGOVERNMENTAL
ANTOGOVERNMENTAL
Manipulated people

Worthy People

Destabilization/Civil

Peaceful protest/the will of Georgian

war/bloodshed/chaos

people

Motivation/will of coming into power

Fair battle

Fair elections with minor

Falsification of elections/violation of

violations/transparent, democratic

election rights/election lists

elections/fair elections ever since
Shevardnadze

Call for negotiation and agreement

Necessity for government resignation

Other

Other
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FRAMES (count existence of each using hash marks)
NUMBER of responsibility frame

NUMBER of conflict frame

Number of economic subsequences
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK
Coder: Record your name.
Story ID: record a number of the story within the news program.
News program: record the name of the news program, where the story was aired.
Date: record day, when the program was aired
Sources:
1. Local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media
Number of the representatives of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s
representatives, media sources supporting ruling party -record if a reporter used as a source local
celebrities (artists, sportsmen, writers, example: Ramaz Chkhikvadze, Robert Sturua, Gia
Bughadze, etc.) and experts (president’s advisors, economists, civil rights organizations,
example: Gia Nodia, Ramaz Sakvarelidze, Tinatin Khidasheli, Zura Chiaberashvili, etc), foreign
country’s representatives (Mission of European Union, any foreign observers, foreign country’s
ambassadors, example: Richard Miles, etc.), media (any quoted newspaper, television station,
magazine, online media, example: Guardian, CNN, NTV, etc.) supporting ruling party, making a
statement that has positive evaluation of the elections and negative of the protests, that repeats or
agrees with the statements of ruling party that elections were fair even with minor violations,
president has situation under control, reformers and protests will cause destabilization and
economic hindering of the country. (example: the head of EU Mission said that that elections
took place, though there were some minor violations that did not effect the general outcome of
the elections)
2. Number of the representatives of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s
representatives, media sources supporting reformers -record if a reporter used as a source local
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celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media sources supporting reformers,
making a statement that has negative evaluation of the president’s and ruling party behavior and
positive evaluation of the protests, repeats or agrees with the statements of reformers that the
elections were violation of voters’ rights, the results did not express true will of people, citizens
have to defend their rights by means of peaceful protests
3. Number of other sources – record the number of local celebrities and experts, foreign
country’s representatives, media sources, not supporting any of opposing parties’ viewpoints,
blaming them both or agrees with certain claims from both parties’ statements (example: Sturua
saying that we must avoid bloodshed)
Self:
1. Number of the representatives of the bloc “For New Georgia” supporting the ruling
party - Record the number of sources from the bloc “For New Georgia” (President
Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Jorbenadze, active representatives: Sarishvili, Mamaladze,
Xazaradze, etc.) making statements against the reformers and their supporters and expressing the
point of view of the ruling party
2. Number of the representatives of the reformers supporting reformers - record the
number of sources from the representatives of reformers (Saakashvili, Burjanadze, Jvania,
Davitashvili, etc.) expressing point of view of their party and allies, making statements about
falsification of elections and against the ruling party or their allies.
3. Number of other sources – record if the story has sources from the ruling or
reformer’s parties who do not support the view point of their parties or their allies and support
certain claims from both of them or criticizing both of them (mostly such claims come from the
representatives of ruling party, Nadareishvili, Karkarashvili, etc. especially on the second week
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(9-16 November) of protests, when Shevardnadze calls for negotiation. Example: Both sides
should compromise, government have to find a common language with the protesters.)
Ordinary citizens
1. Number of ordinary citizens supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - record if the
reporter refers to ordinary citizens (ordinary citizens, who do not represent any party or
institution, students, etc.) as a source who demonstrate their support for New Georgia, saying
they had not any problems during voting, elections were fair and they support Shevardnadze and
are against the protests
2. Number of the representatives of ordinary citizens supporting the reformers - record if
the reporter refers to people (participants of demonstrations, ordinary citizens, students) as a
source who claimed that their rights were violated and their voice was lost during unfair
elections, they support reformers or are against the ruling party
3. Number of other sources - record the number of citizens, not supporting any of
opposing parties’ viewpoints, supporting certain claims from both of them, criticizing both of
them, talking about other than election or protest issues (example: No, I don’t want civil war;
Zugdidi made fair choice; etc.)
Representative of any other political party
1. Number of the representatives of other political parties supporting the bloc “For New
Georgia” - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New
Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who make
statements in favor of ruling party, saying that exit polls don’t express everything, reformers
were part of the ruling party before who fabricated elections. Example: (Davit Gamkrelidze –
These elections were fair in comparison of fabrication of elections before by the reformers.)
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2. Number of the representatives of other political parties supporting the reformers Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New Rights, Labor
Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who make statements in favor
of reformers and protests and again the ruling party and Schevardnadze
3. Number of other sources - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional
parties such as New Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity
(Ertoba), who support certain claims of both parties or criticizing both of them (Natelashvili
saying that ruling party and reformers both are the same party now split for power and
parliamentary seats)
Representative of Central Election Committee
1. Number of the representatives of central election committee supporting the bloc “For
New Georgia” - Record the number of representatives of the Central Election Committee or its
local representatives who say, elections were fair and representative, though with minor
violations, or make any claim in favor of the ruling party and against reformers and protests
(Devdariani – the protesters are trying to influence us, but I can’t write the outcomes of the
elections as they want me to write them)
2. Number of the representatives of central election committee supporting the reformers
- Record the number of representatives of the Central election committee or its local
representatives who say, elections were unfair and under-representative, give examples of
falsification, etc. make any statement in favor of the reformers (mostly these are representatives
of national movement party and the democrats in the election committee)
3. Number of other sources – record if the representatives of central election committee
or its branches support certain claims from both of the parties or criticize both of them
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Other sources
1. Number of other sources supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - record the number
of any other source that not match the above categories who claims support of the bloc For New
Georgia and said elections were fair and the protesters will cause destabilization (most often
these are representatives of executive branch – gamgebeli, meri, etc.) example: Zugdidi is quiet,
reformers could not make citizens to come out into the streets and join the protests
2. Number of the representatives of other sources supporting the reformers - record the
number of any other source that not matched the above categories who claims support of the
reformers and said elections were unfair
3. Number of other sources not falling into any of above-mentioned categories –
record the number of other sources not falling into any of above-mentioned categories
Key words: count the number of key words and key terms using hash marks: ///////////
Key words and key terms indicate either pro-governmental or anti governmental position.
Pro-Government key terms:
1) “Manipulated people” - this term is often used for blaming certain politicians for
imanipulating public to protest government, using public to achieve their political ends and
therefore emphasizing the weakness of public opinion. Example: “A bunch of manipulated
people is gathering in front of the Parliament.”
2) “Civil war/bloodshed/destabilization/chaos” – the term is used to identify
demonstrations and public gatherings as a reason for future civil war and bloodshed. Those
opposed to government politicians are blamed for splitting the Georgian public into two
adversary groups that will defend themselves by means of arms and thus bloodshed will be

59

inevitable. Example: “in 1992 we experienced what this kind of destabilization causes. We don’t
want one more civil war, one more bloodshed.”
3) “Motivation/will of coming into power” - it was said that the only reason
oppositional politicians were opposing the government and the results of the election was their
motivation to come into power. Example: “Jvania is opposing the official results of the 2nd
November, because he wants to come to power. Unlike the results of exit polls ordered by him,
the results of the Central Election Committee show it is possible that he will stay out of the
Parliament.”
4) “Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections” Governmental sources were claiming that overall the elections were fair, but had some minor
violations that did not affect the final outcome. Example: “Despite the minor violations, in
whole, the 2nd November elections were the most fair elections of the past years.”
5) Call for negotiation and agreement - the president often stresses that he was eager to
meet the organizers of the protests and calls for negotiations. By doing so, he stresses that despite
his efforts the opposition was radical and unwilling to start the dialogue. Example: “I was
waiting for Jvania, Burjanadze and others yesterday. They promised to come, but did not show
up.”
6) Other: record the number of any keyword or term that did not matched the abovementioned categories.
Anti-government keywords:
1) Worthy people: Record the number of times when people taking part in
demonstrations were called worthy people who came out into the streets to defend their dignity,
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and their dignity was defined as the right to vote. Example: “Georgians are worthy people. They
won’t let the government ignore their choice.”
2) The will of Georgian people/peaceful protest - record the number of times when the
statements that manifestations and demonstrations against the government were defined as a will
of people to defend their rights. Example: “The Government is neglecting the will of Georgian
people, who are standing in front of the Parliament, despite the rain, wind and cold, to defend
their voice.”
Record the number of times when the protests were defined as a peaceful way of
changing the government. Oppositional forces, claiming that people thought it was possible to
change the government peacefully by voting, often used this term. Government took this
possibility from people by falsification of elections. Now people were trying to reinstate justice.
Example: “Join us in a peaceful protest, in a peaceful way of replacing the existing government.”
3) Fair battle: record the number of times when demonstrations were defined as a fair
battle for defense of the right to vote and to fair elections. Example: “This is a fair battle to
defend our voices.”
4) Falsification of elections/ election lists/violation of voter’s rights: record the
number of times when source was claiming that elections were dramatically falsified. Example:
“It is evident that the results of the elections are totally fabricated in order to falsify the
elections.” Record if the source was claiming that government violated the right of vote.
Example: “Shevardnadze violated the election rights of the voter, he took away our voices and
by doing so, his party obtained the first place.”
5) Call for resignation of the president: record the number of times when any of the
sources said it was time for the president’s resignation. Example: “The president can’t hear our
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voices any more. He can’t rule the country according to the needs of its own citizen’s. The
president has to resign.” Include also the scan of protesting people. Example: “Retire! Retire!” or
“Go away!”
6) Other: record the number of times when there was any other key word or term that
was in favor of protesters and against the government.
Frames (count existence of each)
Besides the key words and key terms, the context of a particular broadcast story might
indicate a certain frame. Therefore, the unit of analysis should be each story. Select one of the
following categories: responsibility frame, conflict frame, economic consequences frame or
human-interest frame.
Responsibility frame: Places blame or attributes cause. Portrays an issue or problem in a
way that attributes responsibility for its cause to government, individuals, or interest groups.
Example for the responsibility frame: “The chief of the local election committee himself closed
the election district and deprived the voters their right to vote.”
Conflict frame: stresses conflict or disagreement between individuals, institutions or
different groups and the government, in order to capture more audience interest. Example for the
conflict frame: “Saakashvili doesn’t like the methods of Burjanadze. Burjanadze doesn’t like his
radical tone.”
Economic consequences frame: pictures an event, problem or issue focusing on the
economic impact it might have on an individual, group, institution, region, or country. Example
for the economic consequences frame: “During these days, the economic index of the country
became worse.”

62

VITA
Nino Danelia was born on November 25, 1972, in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia. In 1996
she graduated from Tbilisi State Academy of Fine Arts, Department of Arts and Architecture.
After graduation with honors she started to work at the daily newspaper Resonance as a cultural
affairs observer. From 1996 to 2000 she was an arts reporter, cultural affairs observer and the
head of the arts review department. From 2000 to 2002 she worked for the radio green wave as
an co-editor and co-anchor of the morning radio Talk-show and as an editor and anchor of the
program “Veil”; During 2003 she was the producer, editor and anchor of the weekly
informational analytical program Kviris ambebi.
At the same time she actively collaborated with the Georgian non-governmental
organization Arts without Frontiers. She managed several projects concerned with the gender
and other social equality issues. She also organized several exhibitions of modern Georgian Art.
In March 2003 she was selected as a teaching assistant at the Caucasus School of
Journalism and Media Management. The same year she received a scholarship from International
Center of Journalists to earn a master’s degree in mass communication at Louisiana State
University. That degree will be conferred at the December 2005 Commencement.

63

